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THE US SUPREME COURT’S ‘ENEMY COMBATANT’ DECISIONS: 





In its recent judgments in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v. 
Bush, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the executive’s claim that it 
has the authority to incarcerate people suspected of terrorist connections without 
any judicial review. This article argues that, nevertheless, the suggestion that 
these decisions constitute a major setback for the US administration which will 
forever change the legal parameters of the ‘war on terror’ is misleading. For the 
court has upheld, in principle, the government’s power to designate terrorist 
suspects as ‘enemy combatants’ and to hold them without charging them with a 
criminal offence or according them prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva 
Conventions. And it is exactly this creation of a special category of detainees, not 
envisaged by international law, which underlies the most important controversies 
surrounding the government’s treatment of suspected terrorists. Furthermore, the 
procedural rules suggested by the Supreme Court for the judicial review of 
‘enemy combatant’ detentions are so deferential to the executive that they could 
render the review all but meaningless. Finally, several controversial elements of 
the government’s post-September 11 detention policies are not addressed by the 
decisions at all. The Supreme Court, it is argued, has missed the chance to impose 
on the executive a clear framework, based on standards of international law, 
governing the detention of alleged terrorists. 
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On 28 June 2004 the Supreme Court of the United States delivered its long-awaited 
judgments in three cases revolving around the executive’s claimed power to detain alleged 
terrorists without judicial review: Rumsfeld v. Padilla,1 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld2 and Rasul v. 
Bush.3 While Rasul v. Bush concerns the foreign nationals held at the US military base in 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, the two other cases involve American citizens suspected of terrorist 
involvement who are in military detention on US mainland. Commentators had anticipated 
that the court would use these decisions as an opportunity to formulate fundamental, generally 
applicable rules for the ‘war on terror’; the New York Times predicted that the cases would 
generate ‘a debate of historic dimension’ about individual rights and the boundaries of 
presidential power.4 Once the rulings had been handed down, they were described as ‘the 
court’s most important statement in decades on the balance between personal liberties and 
national security’.5 Human rights organisations hailed them as ‘historic’6 and as ‘a major 
victory for the rule of law’.7 The general consensus seemed to be that they represent a 
significant setback for the Bush administration’s approach to the ‘campaign against 
terrorism’. 
 The suggestion that the court has inflicted a decisive defeat on the government which 
will forever change the legal parameters of the ‘war on terror’ is, however, misleading. The 
three decisions are actually rather modest in their conceptual reach and leave a number of 
important questions unanswered. In the case where the government is claiming the most far-
reaching powers, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the Supreme Court declined to address the crucial 
substantive issues raised by the administration’s detention policies on technical grounds. 
While in the Hamdi decision the court did conclude that even the detention of persons accused 
of terrorist connections must be subject to some kind of independent review, it proposed (very 
vague) rules for such review procedures which are clearly tilted in favour of the government. 
Finally, the judgment which sparked the most enthusiastic reaction by civil libertarians, Rasul 
v. Bush, is limited in its scope and impact: it is only concerned with the jurisdiction of the 
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American courts over the Guantánamo prisoners and not with the substance of their cases, 
namely the legality of their detention. Controversial central elements of the government’s 
post-September 11 detention policies thus remain unexamined by the highest American court. 
None the less, the Supreme Court’s decisions do establish some general guidelines for the 
review of terrorist detentions and have had significant practical repercussions for the 
proceedings at issue. Yet as these guidelines are worded rather broadly, a dispute as to their 
correct interpretation has already arisen and it seems almost inevitable that the court will at 
some stage have to revisit some of the issues raised by the three cases. 
 Underlying the government’s line of reasoning in all three cases is its designation of 
the detainees as so-called ‘enemy combatants’. This article therefore starts with a short 
discussion of this category, which is not one recognised in international law, and the legal 
consequences the government has attached to this categorisation. This is followed by a 
summary of the justices’ findings in the three ‘enemy combatant’ decisions. Next, the article 
explains what the Supreme Court did not say, identifying several key issues which the court 
did either not touch upon at all or refer to only summarily. Finally, the practical consequences 
of the judgments for those currently detained as ‘enemy combatants’ are evaluated.  
 
 
2. ‘ENEMY COMBATANT’ STATUS 
The US government has designated the American citizens José Padilla and Yaser Hamdi as 
well as the foreign prisoners at Guantánamo Bay as ‘enemy combatants’.8 Yet, as the 
Supreme Court observed in the Hamdi case, it ‘has never provided any court with the full 
criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such.’9 What seems to be common to these 
‘enemy combatant’ classifications is the government’s endeavour to thereby prevent having to 
make a choice between either granting the detainees prisoner-of-war (POW) status under the 
Third Geneva Convention or charging them with a criminal offence. In practice, persons 
described as ‘enemy combatants’ have been detained without charge, interrogated and denied 
both access to legal counsel as well as the right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention. 
 In international humanitarian law the term ‘combatant’ denotes the right to participate 
directly in hostilities.10 Lawful combatants may not be prosecuted for taking part in a conflict, 
                                                 
8
 See Petitioner’s Brief in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, Respondent’s Brief in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Brief for the 
Respondents in Rasul v. Bush. All briefs in the three cases are available at 
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9
 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2639. 
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unless they have committed a violation of international humanitarian law. Upon capture they 
must be granted POW status and treated in accordance with the Convention (III) relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention). The category of ‘enemy 
combatant’, by contrast, is not one recognised in international law. What has been used in 
legal literature and military manuals, though not in treaties of international humanitarian law, 
are the terms ‘unlawful’ or ‘unprivileged combatant’.11 These are generally used to describe 
persons taking part in hostilities without being entitled to do so; they can be prosecuted 
simply for their participation in an armed conflict and are not entitled to POW status upon 
capture.12  
The denial of POW treatment – normally implied by the use of the label ‘unlawful 
combatant’ – is apparently the primary purpose of the ‘enemy combatants’ qualification in the 
case of the Guantánamo prisoners. Any detainees recognised as POWs could not be 
compelled to give any further information than their name, rank, date of birth and 
identification number and would have to be released and repatriated without delay after the 
cessation of hostilities.13 On 7 February 2002, the US President determined that neither the 
Taliban nor the al-Qaeda detainees are entitled to POW status.14 As far as clearly identified al-
Qaeda members are concerned, the conclusion that they do not qualify as POWs seems 
justified. For fighters not forming part of the armed forces of a state are only entitled to POW 
treatment if they fulfil the conditions, listed in Article 4(A)(2) of the Third Geneva 
Convention, of (i) being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (ii) having 
a distinctive sign recognisable at distance; (iii) carrying arms openly; and (iv) conducting their 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. At least the last, and possibly the 
second, of these criteria seem not to apply to al-Qaeda members. For Taliban soldiers, 
however, the situation is different. In their case, the US government has claimed that they did 
not effectively distinguish themselves from civilians nor conduct their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war and did therefore not fulfil the conditions of 
Article 4(A)(2).15 Yet at least the Afghan Taliban fighters arguably represented the armed 
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 See Articles 17 and 118 of the Third Geneva Convention respectively. 
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 See Order signed by President Bush on 7 February 2002, outlining treatment of al-Qaeda and Taliban 
detainees, available at http://lawofwar.org/Bush_torture_memo.htm, and White House Fact Sheet, ‘Status of 
Detainees at Guantanamo’, 7 February 2002. 
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 See Ari Fleischer, ‘Special White House Announcement Re: Application of Geneva Conventions in 
Afghanistan’, 7 February 2002, available in Lexis, Legis Library, Fednew File: ‘The Taliban have not effectively 
distinguished themselves from the civilian population of Afghanistan. Moreover, they have not conducted their 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Instead, they have knowingly adopted and provided 
support to the unlawful terrorist objectives of the al Qaeda.’  
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forces of Afghanistan, and the text of Article 4(A) makes clear that as such they, unlike 
militia and volunteer corps not forming part of the armed forces, did not need to fulfil the four 
requirements mentioned before to qualify for POW status.16  
The most contentious element of the President’s decision to deny POW treatment to 
the Guantánamo prisoners is, however, its blanket nature, encompassing all captives 
irrespective of the particular circumstances of their cases. This stands in stark contrast to the 
cautionary rule of Article 5(2) of the Third Geneva Convention which provides that: 
 
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act 
and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories 
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present 
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent 
tribunal. 
 
As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has pointed out, the determination as 
to the legal status of each internee needs to be made on an individual basis.17 The US 
government’s refusal to do so constitutes the backdrop to the Rasul case. 
In the cases of the US citizens Padilla and Hamdi, the designation as ‘enemy 
combatants’ seems to have been mainly designed to circumvent the procedural safeguards 
applicable in normal criminal procedures. Both of them have been held for more than two 
years without being charged with a criminal offence; they have been denied access to a lawyer 
as well as judicial review of their detention. The criteria used by the US authorities to 
determine whether terrorist suspects are held as ‘enemy combatants’ or charged with a 
criminal offence are unclear. Other American citizens allegedly involved in terrorism, for 
example John Walker Lindh and James Ujaama, and even the French ‘twentieth hijacker’ 
Zacarias Moussaoui and the British ‘shoe bomber’ Richard Reid were charged with terrorism-
related offences rather than designated as ‘enemy combatants’.18 The most plausible 
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 Lindh, who had been captured fighting alongside the Taliban, was sentenced to 20 years in prison as part of a 
plea agreement; Ujaama, who allegedly had links with al-Qaeda, also entered a plea agreement and was 
sentenced to a two-year prison sentence; Moussaoui has been charged with a number of terrorist offences for his 
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explanation for this inconsistent policy would seem to be that the evidence against those 
described as ‘enemy combatants’ is not strong enough for a criminal prosecution. This makes 
it all the more important that such detention without charge on national security grounds is at 
least subject to judicial review. The right to be free from arbitrary detention, entailing a right 
to challenge the lawfulness of detention in court, is guaranteed by a number of international 
human rights standards, including Articles 9(1) and 9(4) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by the United States. Indeed, it is widely 
acknowledged as forming part of customary international law.19 The availability of this right 
and details concerning its exercise form the central contentious issues in both the Padilla and 
the Hamdi cases. 
 
 
3. WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SAID 
3.1 Rumsfeld v. Padilla 
José Padilla, an American citizen who converted to Islam, was arrested on 8 May 2002 at 
O’Hare International Airport in Chicago under a warrant declaring him to be a material 
witness in the September 11 investigation. He was transported to New York where he was 
held in federal criminal custody. Before a New York district court could rule on motions 
contesting the arrest, President Bush, on 9 June 2002, issued an order to the Secretary of 
Defense designating Padilla an ‘enemy combatant’ and directing the Secretary to detain him 
in military custody. According to the government, Padilla was closely associated with the al-
Qaeda network and was planning to detonate a radioactive ‘dirty bomb’ in the United States. 
Padilla was transferred to a military base in South Carolina, where he has been held 
incommunicado ever since.  
 On 11 June 2002, Padilla’s lawyer filed a habeas corpus petition in the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York, naming President Bush, Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld and Melanie A. Marr, the commander of the naval brig in which Padilla is detained, 
as respondents. The district court held that the Secretary of Defense (but not Bush or Marr) is 
                                                                                                                                                        
alleged involvement in the September 11 attacks; Reid was sentenced to life in prison for his attempt to blow up 
a plane. 
19
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is recognised as an authoritative statement of customary 
international law, contains the obligation to provide detainees with an opportunity to challenge their detention in 
court: see Articles 9-10. The principle is also included in all major human rights treaties and supported by wide 
international practice as evidenced by, e.g., Principle 32 of the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by the General Assembly by Resolution 
43/173, UN Doc. A/43/49(1988). See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 
1987, § 702. 
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a proper respondent and that it has jurisdiction over him.20 On the merits, however, the court 
accepted the government’s contention that the President has the power to detain US citizens 
captured on American soil during a time of war as ‘enemy combatants’. According to the 
district court, this authority arises from two sources: First, from the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force Joint Resolution (AUMF), enacted by Congress on 18 September 2001, which 
authorises the President ‘to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in 
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such 
nations, organizations or persons.’ And second, from the President’s constitutional authority 
as Commander-in-Chief to take any military measures he deems necessary in the conduct of 
an armed conflict.21 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed this decision.22 
While it agreed with the district court that Secretary Rumsfeld is a proper respondent, it 
concluded that neither the AUMF nor the President’s Commander-in-Chief power explicitly 
authorises the military detention of Padilla.23 Accordingly, the court granted the writ of 
habeas corpus and directed the Secretary of Defense to release Padilla from military custody 
within 30 days. The government appealed to the Supreme Court. 
 A 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court overturned the Second Circuit’s decision on 
jurisdictional grounds. The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that 
Padilla’s lawyer filed the habeas corpus petition in the wrong court and declined to rule on the 
merits. The proper respondent to a habeas petition was the person who has immediate custody 
of the party detained and not some remote supervisory officials – in Padilla’s case, the 
commander of the naval brig, Melanie A. Marr, rather than the Secretary of Defense.24 
Accordingly, the majority found that the petition should have been filed in the district of 
actual custody, i.e. South Carolina rather than New York. The purpose of this long-standing 
jurisdictional rule was to prevent ‘forum shopping’ by habeas petitioners.25 
 Justice Stevens, joined by three further judges, filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that 
‘this exceptional case’ should be afforded special treatment.26 The Secretary of Defense was a 
proper custodian, as he had been entrusted with control over Padilla and was the only person 
                                                 
20
 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F.Supp.2d 564, 587. 
21
 Ibid., 588-599. 
22
 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695. 
23
 Ibid., 724. 
24
 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. 2721-22. 
25
 Ibid., 2724-25. 
26
 Ibid., 2730. 
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who had had a say in determining Padilla’s location.27 Furthermore, Stevens continued, New 
York is the more appropriate forum than South Carolina, since the government had sought the 
material witness warrant for Padilla’s detention in New York and had transferred him to 
South Carolina only once the New York judge and counsel had already become familiar with 
the issues surrounding the case.28 
 
3.2 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
Yaser Esam Hamdi is a US citizen who was born in Louisiana and raised in Saudi Arabia. In 
2001, he was captured in Afghanistan by members of the Northern Alliance and turned over 
to the US army who sent him to Guantánamo Bay. In April 2002, upon discovering Hamdi’s 
citizenship, the US authorities transferred him first to a naval brig in Virginia and then to the 
same military prison in South Carolina where Padilla is detained. There, he has been held ever 
since, until recently without access to a lawyer. 
 Hamdi’s father brought a habeas corpus petition on his behalf, asserting that his son 
had gone to Afghanistan to do humanitarian work and that he was trapped there once the 
military campaign began. The government filed a response and a motion to dismiss the 
petition, attaching a declaration from Michael Mobbs (‘Mobbs Declaration’), a Department of 
Defense (DoD) official, which ‘remains the sole evidentiary support that the Government has 
provided to the courts for Hamdi’s detention.’29 The declaration states that Hamdi has 
affiliated with a Taliban military unit and that he was captured with a rifle when his unit 
surrendered to the Northern Alliance forces; in light of his association with the Taliban he had 
been classified as an ‘enemy combatant’. 
 A Virginia district court found that the two-page Mobbs Declaration falls ‘far short’ of 
supporting Hamdi’s detention and criticised it as ‘little more than the government’s “say-
so”.’30 It ordered the government to produce much more detailed materials to enable a 
‘meaningful judicial review’ of Hamdi’s classification.31 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
however, overturned the district court order and dismissed the habeas petition.32 It held that 
Congress has authorised the detention of ‘enemy combatants’, including those of US 
citizenship, through the AUMF. As it was undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a combat 
zone in a foreign theatre of conflict, the Fourth Circuit concluded that he is not entitled to a 
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 Ibid., 2733. 
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 Ibid., 2735. 
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 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2637. 
30
 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F.Supp.2d 535. 
31
 Ibid., 533.  
32
 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d. 450. 
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judicial review of the factual determinations underlying his seizure, in the present case of the 
assertions set out in the Mobbs Declaration.33 
 The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit and remanded the case to the district 
court for further proceedings. The plurality opinion,34 written by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, answers the 
questions raised by the case in two separate steps. First, O’Connor examined whether the 
executive has the authority to detain American citizens as ‘enemy combatants’. This question 
is answered in the affirmative: The AUMF, authorising the President to use ‘all necessary and 
appropriate force’ against those associated with the terrorist attacks of September 11, implied 
the power to detain individuals who fought against the US forces as part of the Taliban.35 
Relying on ex parte Quirin,36 O’Connor held that this power extends to US citizens engaged 
in an armed conflict against the United States, as citizens and non-citizens pose the same 
threat of returning to the front. While the AUMF did not authorise indefinite detention for the 
purpose of interrogation, it was a clearly established principle of the law of war that enemy 
forces could be detained until the end of active hostilities. In the case of the present conflict, 
active combat operations against Taliban fighters were ongoing in Afghanistan.37  
 In a second step, O’Connor addressed the question of what process is constitutionally 
due to a citizen disputing his or her ‘enemy combatant’ status. Answering this question, she 
argued, requires balancing the interest of individuals to be protected from unjustified 
deprivation of liberty against the government’s interest to detain those who have fought with 
the enemy without being imposed undue burdens through complicated procedures. Neither the 
process proposed by the government (and the Fourth Circuit) nor the one envisioned by the 
district court would strike the proper balance between these competing concerns. While the 
risk of erroneous deprivation of a detainee’s liberty was unacceptably high under the 
government’s proposal, the procedural safeguards suggested by the district court were 
unwarranted in light of the burdens they would impose on the military.38 The proper balance, 
O’Connor held, requires that  
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 Ibid., 476. 
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 A ‘plurality opinion’ is an opinion lacking enough judges’ votes to constitute a majority, but receiving more 
votes than any other opinion. See B. Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed., 1999) 1119. In the present 
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 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2640. 
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 In Quirin, the court held that ‘[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy 
government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy 
belligerents within the meaning of ... the law of war.” See 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942). 
37
 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2640-42. 
38
 Ibid., 2648. 
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a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant 
must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair 
opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral 
decisionmaker. […] At the same time, the exigencies of the circumstances may 
demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy combatant proceedings may 
be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time 
of ongoing military conflict.39 
 
Such concessions to the executive could, for example, include the admission of hearsay 
evidence and a presumption in favour of the government’s evidence. Furthermore, the 
requirement of an independent review could also be met by an ‘appropriately authorized and 
properly constituted military tribunal’.40 Whatever the precise procedural standards, 
O’Connor concluded, Hamdi has never been given an opportunity to rebut before a neutral 
decision-maker the factual assertions underlying his classification as an ‘enemy combatant’.41 
 A minority of four judges rejected the government’s position already with regard to 
the first, more fundamental, issue concerning the government’s authority to detain US citizens 
as ‘enemy combatants’. Justices Souter and Ginsburg held that the AUMF does not constitute 
such an authorisation. However, as there was insufficient support for a ruling holding the 
detention illegal, they concurred in the judgment, which at least allows Hamdi to challenge 
his detention in the district court.42 Justices Scalia and Stevens made a similar argument but 
dissented. They opined that there are only two alternatives for detaining American citizens 
accused of fighting against the United States: either they have to be prosecuted for treason or 
some other crime, or Congress has to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. As neither element 
was fulfilled in the present case, the detention of Hamdi was not justified.43 Only Justice 
Thomas supported the government on both contentious points. In his dissenting opinion, he 
argued that the detention of ‘enemy combatants’ falls within the executive’s war powers and 
that the judicial branch lacks the expertise and capacity to review the government’s 
determinations in this field.44 
 
3.3 Rasul v. Bush 








 Ibid., 2652-60. 
43
 Ibid., 2660-74. 
44
 Ibid., 2674-85. 
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In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court had to decide whether US courts have jurisdiction to 
consider challenges to the detention of the foreign nationals held at the Guantánamo Bay 
naval base in Cuba. Sixteen of the approximately 600 Guantánamo prisoners (twelve Kuwaiti, 
two Australian and two British citizens) filed habeas corpus petitions in the District Court for 
the District of Columbia. (The two British petitioners, Shafiq Rasul and Asif Iqbal, have since 
been released.) The district court dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction,45 and the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit confirmed.46 The prisoners appealed to 
the Supreme Court. 
The majority of the Supreme Court ruled that those detained in Guantánamo are 
entitled to have access to US courts under the federal habeas corpus statute. The statute 
provides that district courts may grant writs of habeas corpus ‘within their respective 
jurisdictions’.47 The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, held that the courts act 
‘within their respective jurisdictions’ as long as they have jurisdiction over the officials 
responsible for the detention; the prisoner’s presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
district court was not required.48 American courts, Stevens continued, have the authority to 
review the legality of the executive’s detention of foreign nationals in a territory over which 
the United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, though not ultimate 
sovereignty. With regard to the status of Guantánamo he noted that ‘[b]y the express terms of 
its agreements with Cuba, the United States exercises “complete jurisdiction and control” over 
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and may continue to exercise such control permanently if it 
so chooses.’49 Therefore, Guantánamo was functionally American territory to which the 
jurisdiction of US courts should extend. In addition, as it was undisputed that US courts 
would have jurisdiction over American citizens held at the base and considering that the 
habeas statute draws no distinction between US and foreign detainees, foreign citizens held in 
Guantánamo were equally entitled to apply to American courts.50 
 The government had invoked the Supreme Court’s 1950 decision in Johnson v. 
Eisentrager.51 In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that German citizens captured by US 
forces in China, then tried and convicted of war crimes by an American military commission 
in Nanking, and finally imprisoned in occupied Germany had no right to bring habeas corpus 
applications in US courts. But the Rasul majority noted that the Guantánamo prisoners differ 
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 Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.Supp.2d 55. 
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 Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134. 
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from the Eisentrager detainees in important respects: They are not nationals of countries 
which are at war with the United States; they deny that they have engaged in acts of 
aggression against the United States; they have never been charged or afforded access to any 
tribunals; and they are held in territory under US control.52 Furthermore, Stevens argued, the 
assumptions about the entitlement to habeas review underlying Eisentrager were rejected in 
later Supreme Court decisions.53 
 In a sharp and emotional dissent, which was joined by Justices Rehnquist and Thomas, 
Justice Scalia called the majority’s ruling ‘judicial adventurism of the worst sort’.54 The 
majority’s reading, Scalia argued, contradicts the habeas statute and overrules the Eisentrager 
precedent, even though the military had undoubtedly relied on Eisentrager and ‘had every 
reason to expect that the internment of combatants at Guantanamo Bay would not have the 
consequences of bringing the cumbersome machinery of our domestic courts into military 
affairs.’55 If it was really true – as the majority argued – that ‘jurisdiction and control’ rather 
than sovereignty was the test, also parts of Afghanistan and Iraq should be subject to the 
oversight of American courts and military prisoners held there could bring habeas corpus 
petitions.56 The consequence of this ‘irresponsible overturning of settled law in a matter of 
extreme importance to our forces currently in the field’57 was ‘breathtaking’.58 
 
 
4. WHAT THE SUPREME COURT LEFT OPEN 
The impact of the three ‘enemy combatant’ decisions may in fact be much more limited than 
what Justice Scalia’s dissent in the Rasul case suggests. Rather than developing a 
comprehensive legal framework governing the conduct of the ‘war on terrorism’, the Supreme 
Court stuck to the narrow issues presented by the specific cases at hand. Similarly, though 
occasionally referring to international humanitarian law sources, the court generally avoided 
engaging with the international law dimensions of the cases. As a consequence, numerous 
crucial questions raised by the US administration’s detention practices as well as by the 
justifications advanced in their support remain unanswered, and the court’s attitude towards 
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international law has not been clarified. On the contrary, some of the court’s comments seem 
to raise more problems than they solve. 
 
4.1 Does International Law Matter? 
In its recent jurisprudence, especially in some of its decisions issued during the 2002 and 
2003 terms, the Supreme Court had increasingly referred to international law sources.59 As a 
consequence, the editors of the American Journal of International Law, in a preview on the 
2004 term, wondered ‘whether the new (or newly rediscovered) interest of the Court in 
international sources presages a long-term trend toward a more cosmopolitan constitutional 
jurisprudence.’60 The court’s acceptance for decision in 2004 of quite a few cases raising 
international questions, including the ‘enemy combatant’ cases, they argued, may signal that it 
‘is preparing for a new era of engagement with legal developments external to the United 
States, or, alternatively, that it seeks to limit (or in any event to delimit) the relevance of such 
developments for the U.S. legal system.’61 
 To those advocating an enhanced engagement with international developments, the 
three Supreme Court decisions, especially the one in the Guantánamo case, must come as a 
bitter disappointment. In all three cases the lawyers of the alleged ‘enemy combatants’ had 
vigorously pressed international law arguments, and the numerous amicus curiae briefs 
submitted in their support were full of references to international and regional human rights 
treaties, the Geneva Conventions, pronouncements of the UN Human Rights Committee as 
well as judgments by such diverse bodies as the International Court of Justice, the European 
Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the English Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court of Israel.62 If there ever was an occasion for the Supreme Court to extend its emerging 
pattern of relying on international legal developments, this would have been it. Particularly in 
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the Rasul case international law would have offered strong arguments in support of the court’s 
finding that the jurisdiction of the US courts extends to the Guantánamo Bay naval base: 
international human rights law makes clear that the duty to respect the right to be free from 
arbitrary detention and to challenge the lawfulness of detention in court applies whenever a 
state exercises authority and control over a person, regardless of where the detention occurs.63 
None the less, there is not a single reference to international legal sources to be found in the 
whole of the Rasul decision. 
At the same time, it should be stressed that Rasul does not explicitly dismiss the 
relevance of international and foreign law for the American legal system either. Apparently, 
the Supreme Court’s majority, by accepting the detainees’ claims on the basis of a line of 
reasoning anchored in US law, did simply not find it necessary to enter into a discussion of 
international law. Furthermore, both the Hamdi plurality opinion and the minority opinion 
drafted by Justice Souter do refer quite extensively to the United States’ obligations under 
international humanitarian law. In sum, while there is nothing in the ‘enemy combatant’ 
decisions which would suggest that the Supreme Court is moving ‘toward a more 
cosmopolitan constitutional jurisprudence’,64 the court has not decisively closed the door on 
the possibility of such a development either. This rather ambiguous attitude towards 
international law probably reflects the split of the justices’ views on this delicate question. 
 
4.2 When Can War Powers Be Used Against American Citizens? 
By remanding Rumsfeld v. Padilla on technical grounds, the court has avoided dealing with 
the merits of the case in which the government is asserting the most far-reaching powers. If 
the administration is right, it could capture US citizens on American soil – far from any 
battlefield and unconnected to any traditional armed conflict – and detain them indefinitely as 
‘enemy combatants’ without charge. Even more fundamentally, the logical consequence of 
the government’s line of argument that the President’s war powers extend to all terrorist 
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suspects, wherever they are, is that anyone suspected of terrorism could be shot dead at first 
sight – whether on an Afghan battlefield or in a Detroit supermarket. Thus, Padilla’s case 
concerns the claim which lies at the heart of the US administration’s counter-terrorism 
policies: that there is a global ‘war on terrorism’, from Afghanistan to New York and from 
Iraq to Chicago, justifying extraordinary executive competencies free from judicial 
interference. 
The Supreme Court’s findings in Hamdi suggest that also in Padilla’s case the 
government will hardly be able to continue to refuse an independent review of his detention. 
Yet the fundamental question of whether the President is, in principle, authorised to use war 
powers on American soil against US citizens suspected of terrorist involvement remains 
unanswered. As Justice O’Connor stressed in her plurality opinion in Hamdi, the court in that 
case only confirmed the executive’s authority to militarily detain US citizens falling into the 
narrow category of individuals who, allegedly, were part of or supporting enemy forces in 
Afghanistan and engaged in an armed conflict against the United States there.65 Whether this 
authority extends to terrorist suspects who are confronted elsewhere than on the Afghan 
battlefields, whether something like a ‘war on terrorism’ exists – these questions will remain 
unresolved for some time. Padilla’s lawyer has to re-file in the correct district court and it will 
probably be a year or two before the Supreme Court revisits his case and addresses these key 
issues – provided the government does not charge and prosecute him in the criminal courts in 
the meantime. 
 The Hamdi opinions do, however, offer some hints of the Supreme Court judges’ 
views on these broader questions. It is safe to assume that the four justices who rejected the 
government’s position on its authority to detain US citizens as ‘enemy combatants’ would 
rule in favour of Padilla. And even O’Connor seemed to suggest that she would probably stick 
to a traditional conception of armed conflict according to international humanitarian law and 
not endorse the detention of suspected terrorists for the duration of a broadly defined ‘war on 
terror’. The court’s understanding of the executive’s detention powers in Hamdi, she stressed, 
is based on long-standing law-of-war principles and ‘[i]f the practical circumstances of a 
given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the 
law of war, that understanding may unravel.’66 Similarly, again referring to humanitarian law 
principles, she made clear that the purpose of military detention should be to prevent captured 
individuals from returning to the battlefield and not to interrogate them.67 
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4.3 What Should Future Habeas Proceedings Look Like? 
While the Supreme Court held that both Hamdi as well as the Guantánamo prisoners have the 
right to bring habeas corpus proceedings in American courts, it did not go into any details 
with regard to the procedural and substantive standards which should govern such 
proceedings. In the Rasul case, the court simply stated that ‘[w]hether and what further 
proceedings may become necessary after respondents make their response to the merits of 
petitioners’ claims are matters that we need not address now.’68 The Hamdi decision at least 
offers a few hints of how the procedure by which ‘enemy combatant’ detention can be 
challenged could look like. 
 
4.3.1 Who Can Sue When Where? 
One of the open questions concerning the habeas proceedings to come is whether this right 
will be available to foreign citizens detained elsewhere than at Guantánamo Bay. Justice 
Scalia warned in his Rasul dissent that the majority, through its ‘jurisdiction and control’ test, 
would open the American courts to all prisoners held by US forces, wherever they are 
detained.69 As explained above, such a reading of the Rasul decision would in fact be 
consistent with international law: it is a well-established principle that a state cannot escape 
its obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law by detaining persons 
outside its borders.70 Yet whether a majority of the Supreme Court would really be willing to 
extend the right to bring habeas proceedings to detainees held in places other than 
Guantánamo Bay – such as military bases in Iraq or Afghanistan – seems far from certain: the 
majority opinion sets great store by the special status of the Guantánamo Bay naval base, 
deriving from the lease agreement between Cuba and the United States which provides that 
the United States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over the base and may continue 
to do so permanently.71 
 Further, it is as yet unclear how soon after seizure the right of combatants to challenge 
their detention becomes effective. The only reference to this issue in the Supreme Court’s 
decisions is the statement in the Hamdi opinion that ‘initial capture on the battlefield need not 
receive the process we have discussed here; that process is due only when the determination is 
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made to continue to hold those who have been seized.’72 Yet it will often be difficult to 
actually situate the point in time of this determination. In Hamdi’s case, was it the moment 
when he was removed from the immediate zone of combat? Or when the Northern Alliance 
handed him over to the US forces? Or when the US military transferred him to Guantánamo 
Bay? Or when he was transferred to Virginia? Depending on how this question is answered, 
the relevant moment triggering Hamdi’s right to bring habeas proceedings could have been at 
any point in time between one day and half a year, or even more, after his capture. The 
problem is further complicated by the fact that the timing of the decision to continue to detain 
someone is within the complete discretion of the military. In how far is the custodian allowed 
to delay the determination? Sooner or later the courts will have to clarify these questions. 
When doing so, they should be guided by relevant standards of international human rights 
law: Article 9(4) of the ICCPR, for example, entitles any person detained to challenge the 
lawfulness of his or her detention in a court ‘without delay’.73 
 Finally, the Supreme Court’s decisions raise the question as to the appropriate forum 
for bringing habeas corpus petitions when the detentions are ordered by the President or 
another federal official. The majority in Rasul concluded that US courts have jurisdiction to 
consider the challenges to the detention of the Guantánamo Bay prisoners. According to 
Justice Scalia’s dissent this ruling implies that, as the prisoners are not confined in one of the 
federal districts, they could petition in any one of the 94 judicial districts – and, as a result, to 
forum shop.74 Conversely, the finding in Padilla that detainees must sue their immediate 
custodian in the district of actual custody means that, in the case of prisoners held on US 
territory, the government can choose the forum in which it litigates by imprisoning (or 
transferring) detainees there. That the venue of litigation can be of decisive importance when 
national security issues are involved is demonstrated by the divergent court of appeal 
decisions on the President’s authority to detain ‘enemy combatants’ in the Padilla and Hamdi 
cases. The Supreme Court could have prevented the real danger of forum shopping – both by 
detainees and the government – by concluding that in ‘enemy combatant’ detentions ordered 
by the President or another federal official, the President or that official is a proper respondent 
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in a habeas corpus proceeding and the District Court for the District of Columbia the proper 
forum.75 
 
4.3.2 What Kind of Due Process Standards Do Apply? 
As far as the due process requirements in the habeas proceedings to come are concerned, the 
Rasul decision offers no guidance whatsoever. Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi, 
by contrast, sketches out a process which she called ‘a basic system of independent review’76 
and which Justice Scalia criticised as ‘an unheard-of system’ based on ‘constitutional 
improvisation’.77 Indeed, the problem underlying the plurality’s approach is that, having 
concluded that the executive is, in principle, authorised to detain citizens as ‘enemy 
combatants’, it tried to make up for the executive’s failure to apply due process protections by 
itself establishing the needed procedures. All the plurality seemed to rely on when drawing up 
this system is the endeavour to find a fair balance between the due process rights of detainees 
and the government’s interest to protect national security. The result of this balancing act is 
the broad outlines of a process which would be highly deferential to the executive: 
 
Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available 
evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the Constitution 
would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, 
so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for 
rebuttal were provided. Thus, once the Government puts forth credible evidence 
that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift 
to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls 
outside the criteria.78 
 
As, apart from unspecified ‘screening’ processes and military interrogations, Hamdi had 
received no process at all, the Supreme Court had no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that 
its proposed basic review standard was not satisfied in his case. Yet it is not evident how 
compliance with this standard would be assessed in less clear-cut cases or, indeed, in the 
ordered review proceedings in Hamdi’s case. What, for example, is ‘credible’ and ‘more 
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persuasive evidence’ respectively? Does it count as a ‘fair opportunity for rebuttal’ when the 
detainee has to search for evidence or witnesses in the Afghan desert? Is any hearsay evidence 
acceptable, irrespective of its source? 
 The Hamdi plurality’s rough sketch of a possible review system is further obscured by 
its similarly vague proposition that the neutral decision-maker before which ‘enemy 
combatants’ must be allowed to challenge their detention need not necessarily be an ordinary 
court. As Justice O’Connor stated rather ambiguously, ‘[t]here remains the possibility that the 
standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly 
constituted military tribunal.’79 Yet, instead of spelling out the requirements such tribunals 
would have to meet as well as the details of the corresponding process, O’Connor only adds a 
short reference to the process established under a 1997 US Army Regulation to determine the 
status of detainees who claim to be POWs under the Geneva Conventions.80 Significantly, this 
Regulation provides, in accordance with Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, that 
detainees must be treated as POWs until their status is ascertained by a competent tribunal.81 
This is not what has happened in the ‘enemy combatant’ cases, and O’Connor’s suggestion 
for a presumption of ‘enemy combatant’ status seems to be at odds with both the Army 
Regulation she is referring to and international humanitarian law.82 In addition, the Army 
Regulation does not provide for such extraordinary evidentiary rules as the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence. Not surprisingly, the DoD was swift to take up the Hamdi plurality’s 
advantageous, though vague, propositions and has created military Combatant Status Review 




5. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES 
The most important consequence of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hamdi and Rasul is that 
all those being held by the United States as ‘enemy combatants’ – whether American citizens 
or not – must now be given the opportunity to challenge their detention in US courts. As 
explained in the previous section, the decisions leave, however, some room for interpretation 
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with regard to the specifics of the relevant proceedings, and the battleground between the 
government and those representing the detainees is now shifting from the basic question as to 
the existence of a right to judicial review of ‘enemy combatant’ detention to the more specific 
issue as to the exact standards which should govern these procedures. The government’s 
purported first steps to implement the court’s decisions, reviewed below, and the reactions 
they provoked with the detainees’ lawyers and human rights advocates suggest that the new 
controversy will be just as vigorously fought out and protracted as the dispute which led to the 
decisions at hand and might well equally end up in the Supreme Court. 
 
5.1 Padilla 
For José Padilla, the Supreme Court’s decision in his case means that, for the moment, he 
remains in military custody without charge or judicial review of his detention. Four days after 
the Supreme Court had issued its judgment, his lawyer re-filed the habeas corpus petition, this 
time in the District Court for the District of South Carolina, naming the commander of the 
naval brig in Charleston where Padilla is held as respondent.84 At the time of writing, the 
court was expected to hear arguments in the case in January 2005.85 After the Hamdi ruling, 
Padilla will probably not find it too difficult to convince the courts that he must be afforded 
judicial review of his detention. Yet whether he will also be able to persuade them of the 
substance of his claim, namely that the executive has no authority to detain him or, 
alternatively, that there is no factual basis for his designation as an ‘enemy combatant’, is a 
different question altogether. Certainly his chances have not been improved by the change of 
venue ordered by the Supreme Court. While in the first round the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in New York had ruled in his favour, the now competent Fourth Circuit 
adopted a distinctly deferential approach to the government’s arguments in the Hamdi case. 
And, as explained above, the courts’ interpretation of the evidential standards sketched out in 
the Hamdi decision could be of decisive importance in the habeas proceedings of alleged 
‘enemy combatants’ to come. 
 
5.2 Hamdi 
How the process to challenge ‘enemy combatant’ classification advanced by the Supreme 
Court in the Hamdi decision would work in practice will never be tested in his own case. For, 
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after nearly three years of solitary confinement, Yaser Hamdi was released on 11 October 
2004 and deported to Saudi Arabia, where his family lives.86 In return, Hamdi agreed to 
renounce his US citizenship, not to sue the United States over his imprisonment and to abide 
by certain travel restrictions.87 The government stated that Hamdi was freed because 
‘considerations of United States national security did not require his continued detention’, 
without giving any reasons for the suddenly changed assessment as to his dangerousness.88 
The thought suggests itself that his release was as a reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision, 
especially as the negotiations leading to the agreement had been taken up immediately after 
the pronouncement of the judgment.89 Apparently, the government believed that the evidence 
against Hamdi would not be sufficient to meet even the lenient standard required by the 
Hamdi plurality and preferred to free him rather than to explain in court why he was 
designated as ‘enemy combatant’. 
 
5.3 The Guantánamo Detainees (Rasul) 
After almost three years of detention, it is still not clear how much longer the Guantánamo 
prisoners can and will be held. As a direct consequence of the Supreme Court’s Rasul 
decision, two new sets of bodies apart from the government will now be involved in 
answering this question: the ordinary US courts and the newly established Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals. These tribunals should not be confused with the entirely separate military 
commissions which had been created shortly after September 11 to try some of the foreign 
citizens detained in Guantánamo Bay for violations of the laws of war. Almost simultaneously 
with the beginning of the relevant proceedings before the Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
and the ordinary courts, the military commissions started with their first trials of Guantanamo 
detainees. 
 
5.3.1 The Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
The DoD reacted swiftly to the Supreme Court’s decisions and, only ten days later, issued an 
order establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunals.90 The order applies to the foreign 
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citizens held at Guantánamo Bay, giving them the opportunity to contest their designation as 
‘enemy combatants’ before these new review tribunals.91 The tribunals are each composed of 
three military officers, one of whom must be a judge advocate.92 The detainees are not 
permitted the assistance of lawyers in the proceedings before the tribunals but are instead 
assigned military officers as ‘personal representatives’ to assist in connection with the review 
process.93 The detainees can be excluded from parts of the proceedings if their presence 
would compromise national security,94 and are allowed to call witnesses only ‘if reasonably 
available’.95 The tribunals are not bound by the rules of evidence which would apply in 
ordinary courts and are free to consider any information they deem ‘relevant and helpful’, 
including hearsay evidence.96 They determine by majority vote whether a detainee is properly 
detained as an ‘enemy combatant’. The standard used for this determination is ‘preponderance 
of evidence’, but there is a rebuttable presumption in favour of the government’s evidence.97 
Referring explicitly to the passage in O’Connor’s Hamdi opinion which suggests that a 
military tribunal might satisfy the due process requirements articulated by the Supreme Court, 
the DoD claimed that the newly created tribunals would comply with the court’s rulings.98 
 Yet human rights groups decried the establishment of the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals, which started functioning on 30 July 2004, as an attempt by the DoD to subvert the 
Supreme Court’s decisions.99 While the DoD expressly acknowledged that the tribunal 
proceedings do not preclude detainees from seeking review in US courts,100 the human rights 
groups feared that the outcomes of these proceedings (which would normally be in favour of 
the government) would be used as evidence in the ordinary court proceedings, thus deterring 
careful scrutiny and restricting the scope of court review.101 The government’s returns to the 
first habeas corpus petitions on behalf of Guantánamo detainees suggest that that is indeed its 
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strategy.102 However, several elements of the tribunal proceedings let it appear as 
questionable whether courts which would rely on the records emerging from these 
proceedings would comply with the requirements established by the Supreme Court for the 
judicial review of ‘enemy combatant’ detentions.  
Firstly, and most importantly, the plurality in Hamdi held that ‘he unquestionably has 
the right to access to counsel’ in his further review proceedings.103 This is in line with the 
findings of international human rights bodies that an effective exercise of the right to 
challenge the lawfulness of detention is dependent on access to legal representation.104 The 
‘personal representatives’ assigned in the proceedings before the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals are clearly no substitute for the assistance of a lawyer. While it is true that the 
tribunals established to determine POW status which O’Connor favourably referred to in her 
plurality opinion do not require the participation of lawyers, those tribunals are set up near the 
frontlines of the battle and need to be organised quickly, normally determining the status of 
detainees shortly after capture. There are no apparent legitimate reasons for equally denying 
detainees who have been held for nearly three years the assistance of a lawyer. Bearing these 
considerations in mind, it seems unlikely that with its reference to the tribunals under the 
1997 Army Regulation the court intended to somehow qualify its clear statement that an 
‘enemy combatant’ should have access to a lawyer.  
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the Combatant Status Review Tribunals can be 
regarded as ‘neutral decision-makers’ as required by the Supreme Court and as independent 
courts according to international human rights law. Senior military officials up to the 
Secretary of Defense and the President have maintained for almost three years that those held 
in Guantánamo are ‘enemy combatants’.105 This position is even reflected in the order 
establishing the tribunals itself, which explicitly describes the Guantánamo detainees as 
‘enemy combatants’ and stresses that they have been determined as such ‘through multiple 
levels of review by officers of the Department of Defense’.106 To find that a detainee is not an 
‘enemy combatant’, military officers sitting on the tribunals would have to decide against the 
firm position of their superiors. In addition, the tribunals can only confirm the original ‘enemy 
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combatant’ classification or conclude that it was wrong; they may not declare a detainee a 
‘lawful combatant’ or POW, and their findings cannot create a detainee’s right to be 
released.107 As of 18 October 2004, 183 reviews had been carried out, resulting in the release 
of only one of the detainees;108 a large number of prisoners have refused to attend the 
hearings.109 
 
5.3.2 The Civilian Courts 
There are thus good reasons to argue that the military review process should not be allowed to 
somehow restrict or even replace the judicial review of the Guantánamo detentions by the 
ordinary US courts. This civilian review process is now also under way. At least 50 
Guantánamo prisoners have filed habeas corpus petitions in the District Court for the District 
of Columbia; at the time of writing, the first decisions were still outstanding.110 Without 
entering into speculations about the outcome of these proceedings, it is important to note that, 
depending on the courts’ interpretation of the vague ‘basic system of independent review’ put 
forward by the Hamdi plurality, the government could find itself in a very advantageous 
position. Cases are often won and lost on the burden of proof, and according to Hamdi the 
government would only need to put forth ‘credible evidence’ that a detainee is an ‘enemy 
combatant’. Thereupon, the burden would shift to the detainee who would have to prove that 
he was never affiliated with the Taliban or al-Qaeda – a task which might be extremely 
difficult, especially as it might involve finding witnesses or evidence in Afghanistan. Thus, 
much will depend on how the courts construe the vague standards formulated by the Hamdi 
plurality in practice, in particular how exactly they define and apply the threshold test as to 
the production of ‘credible evidence’ by the government.  
 
5.3.3 The Military Commissions 
A military order issued by the US President on 13 November 2001 and subsequent DoD 
orders created the legal basis for trying foreign terrorist suspects before so-called military 
commissions for violations of the laws of war.111 The first of these trials began in August 
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2004 with the preliminary hearings of four alleged al-Qaeda members held at Guantánamo.112 
Neither in Rasul nor in Hamdi or Padilla did the Supreme Court have to consider the legality 
of the military commission trials. The Hamdi plurality did, however, approvingly quote the 
important precedent of Ex Parte Quirin, dating back to the Second World War.113 In Quirin, 
the Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of a military commission established by President 
Roosevelt to try eight Nazi agents who had covertly entered the United States to commit acts 
of sabotage and terrorism. The commissions created by the Bush administration are modelled 
in large part on the military order issued by Roosevelt, and the reference in Hamdi might 
suggest that the court would, in principle, be willing to confirm the legality of trials by 
military commissions. At the same time, this reference can certainly not be construed as an 
approval of the way the process before the commissions has been designed in practice. The 
rules and procedures of the military commissions have been heavily criticised by legal 
scholars, human rights organisations and wide parts of the media for their failure to accord 
with international fair trial standards as set out, in particular, in Article 14 of the ICCPR.114 In 
addition, the impartiality of the military officers selected to hear the cases has been called into 
question.115 There is no indication in the decisions at hand as to whether the Supreme Court 




The Supreme Court’s fundamental finding that, even when the executive is claiming that it is 
engaged in a war, the judiciary still has a role to play, is a significant and welcome statement. 
Judicial review is not only an integral component of the prohibition against arbitrary detention 
but also an important safeguard against torture or other inhuman treatment. Abu Ghraib and 
the fate of the so-called Iraqi ‘ghost prisoners’ stand as a stark reminder of what terrible 
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consequences the removal of detention from independent oversight might entail.116 In its 
‘enemy combatant’ decisions the court made clear that, at least on US territory and in places 
where the United States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’, it will not tolerate such 
legal black holes. International law would have required the court to go even further and state 
the same with regard to any persons under the authority and control of US state agents. 
 At the same time, there is a danger that the procedural rules suggested by the Supreme 
Court could make the judicial review of ‘enemy combatant’ detentions as deferential to the 
government as to render it all but meaningless. In addition, the court’s upholding, in principle, 
of the executive’s authority to detain ‘enemy combatants’ captured abroad means that, at least 
for the moment, the government is not forced to make a choice between charging the 
detainees with a criminal offence and according them POW status under the Geneva 
Conventions. Rather, it can continue to hold them without charge or trial while denying them 
the benefits and protections due to POWs. It is exactly this creation of a special category of 
detainees, not envisaged by international law, which is at the bottom of the most important 
controversies surrounding the government’s treatment of suspected terrorists.  
While the Supreme Court could, of course, not be expected to establish rules for every 
imaginable aspect of the ‘war on terrorism’, it has missed the chance to impose on the 
executive a clear framework, based on standards of international law, which would govern the 
detention of alleged terrorists. Some of the justices’ comments even raise new questions 
which will occupy courts and tribunals on all levels. Hence, although the Supreme Court’s 
decisions represent a step towards increased judicial involvement, the legal battle over the 
rights of ‘enemy combatants’ is far from over.  
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